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Abstract
In discrete exchange economies with possibly redundant and joint ownership, the
conventional strong core may be empty, while the weak core may include unintuitive
outcomes. We propose new core notions in the conventional flavor by regarding
endowments as rights to consume or trade with others. Our key idea is to identify
self-enforcing coalitions and to redistribute their redundant property rights. Our
first notion lies between the strong core and the weak core and is independent of
Balbuzanov and Kotowski’s (2019a) exclusion core. Our second notion refines the
first and the exclusion core by combining their different merits. We generalize the
You Request My House - I Get Your Turn mechanism to find our core allocations.
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1 Introduction
Resource allocation without transfer is at the center of market design. When resources are
controlled by players, cooperative game theory is a powerful tool to predict possible allo-
cation outcomes. In the housing market model in which agents are endowed with distinct
objects, there is a unique core allocation and it is found by Gale’s Top Trading Cycle
mechanism (TTC; Shapley and Scarf, 1974; Roth and Postlewaite, 1977). In a general
allocation model, So¨nmez (1999) relates the existence of desirable mechanisms to single-
valuedness of the core. Observing the contrast between the simplicity of endowments in
economic models and the complexity of property in practice, Balbuzanov and Kotowski
(2019a) (BK hereafter) present a discrete exchange economy with possibly redundant and
joint ownership. An agent may own more than one objects though he is unit-demand, and
multiple agents may co-own an object. The conventional core may be empty (the strong
core) or include unintuitive outcomes (the weak core). BK develop a new solution, called
the exclusion core, by interpreting endowments as a distribution of exclusion rights. An
allocation belongs to the exclusion core if no coalition can make themselves strictly better
off by excluding the others from objects directly or indirectly controlled by the coalition.
The coalition is not restricted to obtain their own endowments. The exclusion core is
nonempty and rules out many unintuitive outcomes.
The purpose of this paper is to “rescue” the conventional core in BK’s model. Following
the convention, we regard endowments as rights to consume or trade with the others. Our
key step is to identify agents’ redundant endowments. As we show, when agents do not
have redundant endowments, the strong core is nonempty. When evaluating the possibility
of blocking an allocation via a new one, we identify the minimal groups of agents who
obtain their own endowments and are no worse off in the new allocation. We call them
self-enforcing. We observe that assuming self-enforcing agents not willing to reallocate
their redundant endowments when it does not benefit themselves is crucial to rescue
the conventional core. In line with the conventional altruism argument in the definition
of the strong core, we assume that self-enforcing agents forgo their redundant property
rights so that (1) any other agent who is assigned any of their redundant endowments
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becomes the de facto owner of the object, (2) the other agents who co-own objects with
self-enforcing agents now have full control over the objects, and (3) any other agent can
freely use redundant endowments of self-enforcing agents that are wasted. As BK have
observed, the conventional altruism argument is misleading because it is too permissible
to form blocking coalitions. Our altruism assumption avoids this problem. By inductively
applying this assumption, we obtain a nonempty core solution called the induction core. It
supersedes the conventional strong core, and coincides with the strong core in many special
cases, including well-studied models in the literature. Below we revisit BK’s motivating
example to illustrate our solution.
Example 1 (Redundant endowment). Two indivisible objects {a, b} are allocated to three
agents {1, 2, 3}. Every agent demands one object and prefers a to b. 1 is the Kingdom
who owns all objects. So it is intuitive that 1 must obtain a. Consider three allocations:
in allocation µ, a is assigned to 1 and b is wasted; in allocation σ1, a is assigned to 1 and
b is assigned to 2; in allocation σ2, a is assigned to 1 and b is assigned to 3. Because µ is
inefficient and the other two are efficient, the other two are intuitive allocations.
In Example 1, the three allocations belong to the weak core, while none belongs to the
strong core. In σ1 or σ2, under the conventional altruism assumption, the agent without an
object can invite 1 to form a coalition and to reallocate b to him. In our solution, because
1 obtains his own endowment and is indifferent between any two of the three allocations,
1 is self-enforcing. Under our altruism assumption, 1 is not willing to reallocate b; he
simply forgoes b. So in µ, any agent without an object can request b to block µ, while in
σ1 or σ2, the agent who obtains b becomes the de facto owner of b so that the third agent
without an object cannot block the allocation. So σ1 and σ2 belong to the induction core.
The induction core and BK’s exclusion core do not include each other, and they have
a nonempty intersection. Sometimes the right to exclude is stronger than the right to
consume or trade. A coalition may exclude the others and make them worse off, but at
the same time occupy their endowments. This is prohibited by the convention we follow
that a blocking coalition have to obtain their own endowments. But sometimes the right
to exclude is inadequate to rule out unintuitive allocations that the conventional core (and
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ours) can easily rule out. Below is a simple example.
Example 2 (Co-ownership). Three agents {1, 2, 3} prefer the unique object a in this
example, and a is co-owned by {1, 2}. However, a is assigned to 3 in an allocation µ.
In Example 2, µ is unintuitive because none of {1, 2} obtains their endowment a.
But µ is in the exclusion core because {1, 2} cannot both become strictly better off by
excluding 3 from a. As BK have explained, ruling out indifferent coalition members is
necessary to ensure the non-emptiness of the exclusion core. To fix this inadequacy, BK
define relational economies and conditional endowments. We observe that the crux of
solving this inadequacy is still the identification of self-enforcing agents. In this example
{1, 2} is self-enforcing. So it is safe to include an indifferent agent in the coalition {1, 2}
to block µ.
We generalize the above observation and propose a refinement of the exclusion core.
The new solution, called refinement core, is in the intersection of the induction core and
the exclusion core, and incorporates the merits of both. That is, the right to exclude
and the right to consume or trade are combined and extended in the refinement core. To
prove its existence, we generalize the so-called You Request My House - I Get Your Turn
mechanism (YRMH-IGYT), which is originally proposed by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez
(1999) to solve the hybrid of the house allocation model and the housing market model.
We prove that all allocations found by YRMH-IGYT belong to the refinement core. The
following graph summarizes the relations between the multiple core solutions and the
outcomes of the mechanism (PE for Pareto efficient).
YRMH-IGYT⊂refinement core⊂(induction core ∩ exclusion core)⊂(weak core ∩ PE)
There are examples in which each set inclusion is strict. We analyze a couple of special
cases of our model, including private ownership, public ownership, and no-redundant
ownership, and show that some of these solutions coincide in special cases. These results
are of independent interest because they cover stylized models in the literature.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and
define the conventional core and BK’s exclusion core. In Section 3, we define self-enforcing
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agents and the induction core. After comparing the induction core and the exclusion core,
in Section 4 we define the refinement core. In Section 5, we present our generalization of
YRMH-IGYT. We explain that two new designs added to the mechanism ensure that it
must find refinement core allocations. In Section 6, we present results for special cases of
the model. In Section 7, we discuss related literature. Appendix includes all proofs.
2 Model
In an economy Γ = (I, O,≻I , {Co}o∈O), I is a finite set of agents and O is a finite set of
indivisible heterogeneous objects. An agent is often denoted by i or j, and an object is
often denoted by a, b, or o. Each agent demands one object and has a strict preference
relation ≻i, which is a linear order, over O ∪ {∅}. Given two objects a and b, we write
a %i b if a = b or a ≻i b. A preference profile is denoted by ≻I= (≻i)i∈I . Every object
o is co-owned by a nonempty set of agents Co ⊂ I. If Co is a singleton, o is privately
owned by the agent. A nonempty subset of agents is a coalition. We say a coalition C ′ is
a sub-coalition of C if C ′ ( C. For each coalition C, define
ω(C) = {o ∈ O : Co ⊂ C}
to be the set of objects controlled by C. We call ω(C) the endowments of C.
For each subset of objects A, define A¯ = A ∪ {∅}, and for each coalition C, define
C¯ = C ∪ {∅}. So for each C, ω¯(C) = ω(C) ∪ {∅}. An allocation is a mapping µ : I¯ → O¯
such that |µ(i)| = 1 for all i ∈ I and |µ−1(o)| = 1 for all o ∈ O. So µ(i) is the object
assigned to i, and if µ(i) = ∅, i obtains nothing, while µ(∅) is the set of unassigned objects.
For each coalition C, define µ(C) = ∪i∈Cµ(i), and µ(C¯) = µ(C) ∪ µ(∅). If C is a set of
coalitions, define ω(C) = ∪C∈Cω(C), µ(C) = ∪C∈Cµ(C), and I(C) = ∪C∈CC.
An allocation µ is Pareto efficient (PE) if there does not exist another allocation σ
such that σ(i) %i µ(i) for all i, and σ(j) ≻j µ(j) for some j.
Definition 1. An allocation µ is weakly blocked by a coalition C via another σ if
1. ∀i ∈ C, σ(i) %i µ(i) and ∃j ∈ C, σ(j) ≻j µ(j);
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2. σ(C) ⊂ ω¯(C).
If ∀i ∈ C, σ(i) ≻i µ(i), then µ is strongly blocked by C via σ. The strong core consists
of allocations that are not weakly blocked, and the weak core consists of allocations that
are not strongly blocked.
As said, the conventional core defined above is problematic in our model. BK present
a new solution called the exclusion core. A coalition have the right to exclude the others
who occupy their endowments or the objects indirectly controlled by them. Formally,
given an allocation µ, the set of a coalition C’s extended endowments is defined to be
Ω(C|ω, µ) = ω(∪∞k=0C
k), where C0 = C and Ck = Ck−1∪ (µ−1 ◦ω)(Ck−1) for every k ≥ 1.
C is said to exclusion block µ via another σ if any worse off agent in σ is excluded from
C’s extended endowments.
Definition 2. An allocation µ is exclusion blocked by a coalition C via another σ if
1. ∀i ∈ C, σ(i) ≻i µ(i);
2. µ(j) ≻j σ(j) =⇒ µ(j) ∈ Ω(C|ω, µ).
The exclusion core consists of allocation that are not exclusion blocked.
In an exclusion blocking coalition, every member is strictly better off in the new
allocation σ. But members in C may obtain the others’ endowments in σ.
3 Self-enforcing coalition and induction core
In our solution, when we ask whether an allocation is blocked via a new one, it is crucial
to identify minimal groups of agents who obtain their own endowments and are no worse
off in the new allocation. Given two distinct allocations µ and σ, we say a coalition C is
• self-feasible in σ if σ(C) ⊂ ω¯(C);
• minimal self-feasible in σ if it is self-feasible and its every sub-coalition is not.
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• self-enforcing from µ to σ if it is minimal self-feasible in σ and ∀i ∈ C, σ(i) %i µ(i).
In words, C is self-feasible if all objects held by its members are from their endowments
ω¯(C). C is minimal self-feasible if its every sub-coalition is not self-feasible. There is an
easy characterization of these coalitions. Represent all agents and objects by nodes, and
construct a graph by letting every object point to all of its owners, and every agent point
to his assignment. If a set of nodes does not have outgoing edges, that is, no node in the
set points to any node outside of the set, then the agents in the set are self-feasible. If
the set is further inside connected, that is, within the set there is a directed path from
every node to every other node, then the agents in the set are minimal self-feasible.1 A
minimal self-feasible coalition in σ is self-enforcing from µ to σ if all of its members become
weakly better off in σ. Let C1(µ, σ) denote the set of such self-enforcing coalitions. When
there is no confusion, we simply write C1. By the above characterization we know that
self-enforcing coalitions are disjoint.
In our solution, a self-enforcing coalition can block µ via σ if one of its members is
strictly better off in σ. In this case, sometimes we simply say that µ is C1(µ, σ)-blocked.
The blocking behavior here is the conventional weak block. Allowing for this type of weak
block does not cause the emptiness problem with the strong core shown in Example 1.
If a self-enforcing coalition blocks µ via σ, we conclude that µ is not in the induction
core defined below. Otherwise, if C1 is nonempty, for all i ∈ I(C1), it must be that
σ(i) = µ(i). Then our altruism assumption says that I(C1) forgo their redundant property
rights from µ to σ in the following sense. First, for any i ∈ I\I(C1), if µ(i) ∈ ω(C1)\σ(C1),
i becomes the de facto owner of µ(i) from µ to σ. Second, if some agents in I\I(C1) co-
own objects with some in I(C1), these agents now have full control over the co-owned
objects from µ to σ. Last, if any redundant endowments of I(C1) are unassigned in µ,
they can be freely used by any coalition from µ to σ. This assumption is formalized by a
new ownership structure. For every o ∈ O\ω(C1), define C1o = Co\I(C
1), while for every
o ∈ ω(C1)\µ(C1), define C1o = {µ
−1(o)}. In particular, unassigned endowments of C1
are regarded as the endowments of the null agent ∅. Let ω1 be the endowment function
1If the set is not inside connected, it must have a strict subset that does not have outgoing edges.
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induced by {C1o} for the remaining agents I\I(C
1).
After defining ω1, we can apply the above idea again. Any coalition C ⊂ I\I(C1)
is self-feasible with respect to ω1 if σ(C) ⊂ ω¯1(C) ∪ ω1(∅). Let C2(µ, σ) be the set of
self-enforcing coalitions with respect to ω1. Any C ∈ C2 can block µ via σ if some of
members is strictly better off in σ. In this case, we say µ is C2(µ, σ)-blocked.
The above idea can be inductively applied to the remaining agents. In general, after we
define ωk, let Ck+1 be the set of self-enforcing coalitions among I\I(∪kℓ=1C
ℓ) with respect
to ωk. Any C ∈ Ck+1 can block µ via σ if some of its members is strictly better off in σ. In
this case, we say µ is Ck+1-blocked. If both Ck+1 and I\I(∪k+1ℓ=1C
ℓ) are nonempty, for every
o ∈ O\ω(∪k+1ℓ=1C
ℓ), define Ck+1o = C
k
o \I(C
k+1), while for every o ∈ ω(∪k+1ℓ=1C
ℓ)\σ(∪k+1ℓ=1C
ℓ),
define Ck+1o = {µ
−1(o)}. Let ωk+1 be the induced endowment function. Let CK be the last
nonempty set of self-enforcing coalitions found in this procedure. Note that we suppress
the dependence of all above notions on the given allocations µ and σ for convenience.
It may seem cumbersome to follow the above procedure to find a blocking coalition.
But actually it has a concise equivalent definition.
Definition 3. An allocation µ is induction blocked by a coalition C via another σ if
1. ∀i ∈ C, σ(i) %i µ(i) and ∃j ∈ C, σ(j) ≻j µ(j);
2. σ(C) ⊂ ω¯(C);
3. for every self-enforcing C ′ ( C and every i ∈ C\C ′, σ(i) ∈ ω(C ′) =⇒ σ(i) ∈ µ(C¯).
The induction core consists of allocations that are not induction blocked.
Lemma 1. An allocation µ is Ck(µ, σ)-blocked for some 1 ≤ k ≤ K if and only if it is
induction blocked via σ.
Definition 3 adds the condition (3) to the weak block in Definition 1. The condition
says that if there exists a self-enforcing sub-coalition C ′ of C, then if any coalition member
outside of C ′ obtains a redundant endowment of C ′ in σ, then the object must have been
assigned to C or unassigned in µ. In other words, if any endowment of C ′ is assigned to
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some agent outside of C in µ, then the object cannot be assigned to any agent in C\C ′.
In Example 1, it means that if {1, 3} want to block σ1, 3 cannot obtain b because b has
been assigned to 2. So σ1 is unblocked in our solution.
The following examples illustrate our definition and the equivalence in Lemma 1.
Example 3 (Redundant endowment and C2-block). Consider four agents 1, 2, 3, 4 and
four objects a, b, c, d. We write preference relations concisely as lists of acceptable objects.
This convention is followed by all following examples.
a b c d
Co: 2 4 2 4
µ: 3 1 2 4
σ 1 2 3 4
≻1 ≻2 ≻3 ≻4
a b a d
b c b b
c a c a
From µ to σ, 4 is self-enforcing because he obtains his private endowment d. Given that,
1 becomes the single owner of b in µ. So {1, 2} block µ via σ by exchanging endowments.
This is an example of C2-block. Equivalently, {1, 2, 4} induction blocks µ via σ.
Example 4 (Redundant co-ownership and C2-block). Consider three agents 1, 2, 3 and
two objects a, b.
a b
Co: 1, 2 2
µ: 3 2
σ: 1 2
≻1 ≻2 ≻3
b b b
a a a
Agents 1 and 2 co-own a, but a is assigned to 3 in µ. From µ to σ, 2 is self-enforcing
by obtaining his private endowment b. Given that, 1 becomes the single owner of a. So
1 can block µ via σ. This is another example of C2-block. Equivalently, {1, 2} induction
blocks µ via σ.
Example 5 (C3-block). Consider five agents 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and five objects a, b, c, d, e.
a b c d e
Co: 2 4 1 4 2
µ: 2 1 3 4 5
σ 5 1 2 4 3
≻1 ≻2 ≻3 ≻4 ≻5
b c e d e
c a c b d
a e d a a
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From µ to σ, 4 is self-enforcing by obtaining his private endowment d. Given that, 1
becomes the single owner of b in µ. So 1 is self-enforcing from µ to σ by obtaining b.
Given that, 3 becomes the single owner of c in µ. So {2, 3} block µ via σ by exchanging
endowments. This is an example of C3-block. Equivalently, {1, 2, 3, 4} induction blocks µ
via σ.
Because induction block is a restriction of weak block, the induction core is a superset
of the strong core. If some C strongly blocks an allocation µ, there must exist a self-
enforcing sub-coalition of C that strongly blocks µ. So the induction core is a subset of
the weak core. Every induction core allocation is Pareto efficient. To see this, suppose
some µ is Pareto dominated by another σ. If µ is not C1-blocked, then all agents as
a coalition induction block µ via σ. Example 1 shows that the induction core can be
strictly between the strong core and the weak core, and Example 2 shows that not all
Pareto efficient weak core allocations belong to the induction core.
All allocations found by YRMH-IGYT in Section 5 belong to the induction core.
Theorem 1. The induction core is nonempty.
The exclusion core is not a superset of the strong core, but it is a subset of the weak
core. All exclusion core allocations are Pareto efficient. The induction core and the
exclusion core do not include each other. The allocation in Example 2 is in the exclusion
core but not in the induction core. Example 6 below shows an allocation in the induction
core but not in the exclusion core. As said, an exclusion blocking coalition needs not
be self-feasible. In Example 6, the blocking coalition makes another agent worse off, but
occupies that agent’s private endowment in the new allocation.
Example 6 (Induction core 6⊂ exclusion core). Consider three agents 1, 2, 3 and three
objects a, b, c.
a b c
Co: 1, 2 3 3
µ: 3 1 2
σ: 1 2 3
≻1 ≻2 ≻3
a b a
b c b
c a c
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Allocation µ is exclusion blocked by {1, 2} via σ because 3 occupies a in µ, the only
endowment of {1, 2}. Note that in σ, {1, 2} not only request a but also occupy 3’s private
endowment b. This is not allowed by induction block. So µ is in the induction core.
Allocation σ is induction blocked and also exclusion blocked by 3 through requesting b.
Last, we clarify that though the induction core supersedes the strong core, they need
not coincide when the strong core is nonempty. See the following example.
Example 7 (Nonempty strong core ( induction core). Consider four agents 1, 2, 3, 4 and
three objects a, b, c.
a b c
Co: 1 1 1, 2
µ: 2 1
σ1 1 3 2
σ2 1 4 2
≻1 ≻2 ≻3 ≻4
c c b b
a b
This example is a modification of Example 1. Allocation µ belongs to the strong core.
Allocations σ1 and σ2 are weakly blocked via each other, but they belong to the induction
core. They are found by YRMH-IGYT in Section 5.
4 Refinement core
The induction core and the exclusion core are based on different interpretations of property
rights. In this section we combine and extend them to obtain a refinement. It solves the
problem with the exclusion core shown in Example 2, and also strengthens the induction
core by allowing agents to exclude the others from indirectly controlled endowments.
In Section 3, for any two allocations µ and σ, we define the sequence of sets of self-
enforcing coalitions Ck as well as the endowment function ωk, where 1 ≤ k ≤ K. First, we
incorporate induction block directly into the refined definition of exclusion block. Suppose
µ is blocked by some C ∈ Ck via σ. Consider an allocation σ′ such that for all i ∈ C,
σ′(i) = σ(i), for all j ∈ I\C with µ(j) ∈ σ(C), σ′(j) = ∅, and for all remaining i′,
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σ′(i′) = µ(i′). Then C weakly blocks µ via σ′, and µ(j) ≻j σ
′(j) =⇒ µ(j) ∈ ωk−1(C).
So induction block can be translated into exclusion block in which indifferent agents may
appear in a blocking coalition. As we show, it does not cause the problem that BK intend
to avoid by ruling out indifferent agents in a coalition. Second, we apply the idea of
exclusion block after the redundant endowments of every Ck are redistributed among the
remaining agents. We say C ⊂ I\I(∪kℓ=0C
ℓ) exclusion blocks µ via σ if all members of C
are strictly better off in σ, and µ(j) ≻j σ(j) =⇒ µ(j) ∈ Ω
(
C|ωk, µ
)
. Combining the two
points, we obtain Definition 4. In the definition, C0 is an empty set and ω0 denotes ω.
Definition 4. An allocation µ is refinement blocked by a coalition C via another σ if
1. ∀i ∈ C, σ(i) %i µ(i) and ∃j ∈ C, σ(j) ≻j µ(j);
2. for some k ∈ {0, . . . , K}, C ⊂ I\I(∪kℓ=0C
ℓ);
3. if σ(i) = µ(i) for some i ∈ C, C ∈ Ck+1(µ, σ);
4. if C /∈ Ck+1(µ, σ), µ(j) ≻j σ(j) =⇒ µ(j) ∈ Ω
(
C|ωk, µ
)
.
The refinement core consists of allocations that are not refinement blocked.
Exclusion block is a special case of refinement block by setting k = 0. By Lemma 1,
induction block is also a special case of refinement block. So the refinement core is in the
intersection of the induction core and the exclusion core. Example 8 shows an allocation
in the latter two cores but not in the refinement core.
Example 8 (refinement core ( (induction core ∩ exclusion core)). Consider five agents
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and five objects a, b, c, d, e.
a b c d e
Co: 1 1, 2, 3 1, 4 5 5
µ: 1 4 5 2 3
σ 1 4 2 3 5
≻1 ≻2 ≻3 ≻4 ≻5
a c d b c
c d e e e
d e b a d
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We show that the allocation µ is in the induction core and the exclusion core. But it
is refinement blocked by {2, 3} via σ.
In allocation µ, {1, 4, 5} obtain their favorite objects. So any induction blocking coali-
tion must include {2, 3}, who request c and occupy d or e to be better off. So 5 is in the
coalition and becomes worse off, which is impossible. So µ is not induction blocked.
To exclusion block µ, {2, 3} have to invite 1 to join the coalition to get full control over
b. However, 1 cannot be strictly better off. So µ is not exclusion blocked.
From µ to σ, 1 is self-enforcing. Under the new endowment function ω1, {2, 3} fully
control b, and 4 privately owns c. So c belongs to the extended endowment of {2, 3}, which
means that they can exclude 5 from c via σ. It is easy to verify that σ is in the refinement
core.
All allocations found by YRMH-IGYT in Section 5 belong to the refinement core.
Theorem 2. The refinement core is nonempty.
5 You Request My House — I Get Your Turn
In this section we generalize YRMH-IGYT to our model. We prove that all of its outcomes
belong to the refinement core. Fix a linear order of all agents ⊲. At the end of each step
t, let I(t) denote the set of remaining agents, O(t) the set of remaining objects, Co(t) the
set of remaining owners of object o. In any step, when some agents trade endowments in a
cycle, their ownerships of the remaining objects are shared with the remaining co-owners
of objects traded in the cycle. We use So(t) to denote the set of agents who obtain shared
ownership of object o at the end of step t.
Initialization: I(0) = I, O(0) = O, and, for all o ∈ O, Co(0) = Co and
So(0) = ∅. Let every object point to the ⊲-highest owner.
Step t ≥ 1: Maintain remaining arcs, if any, between remaining agents and
objects from the previous step. If the agent pointed by any a ∈ O(k − 1) is
removed:
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• If Ca(k − 1) 6= ∅, let a point to the ⊲-highest remaining owner;
2
• If Ca(k− 1) = ∅ and Sa(k− 1) 6= ∅, let a point to the ⊲-highest agent in
Sa(k − 1);
• If Ca(k − 1) = ∅ and Sa(k − 1) = ∅, let a not point to any agent.
Let the first agent i in the current order point to his favorite object o.
• If o = ∅ or o does not point to any agent, let i obtain o and remove them.
• If a cycle appears, clear the cycle and remove it. For every agent j in
the cycle and every remaining object a with j ∈ Ca(k − 1) ∪ Sa(k − 1),
and every object b in the cycle and every remaining agent j′ with j′ ∈
Cb(k − 1) ∪ Sb(k − 1), if j
′ /∈ Ca(k − 1) ∪ Sa(k − 1), add j
′ to Sa(k − 1).
• If there does not exist a cycle and o points to an agent, move the agent
to the top of the order.
In two respects our algorithm generalizes the familiar definition by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez
(1999). First, when a chain as illustrated below appears in some step, instead of clearing
the whole chain as in the familiar definition, we let the last agent in in the chain obtain
the last object on+1 that does not point to any agent. We choose this design because the
second to last object on, which points to the last agent in, may need to point to another
owner or an agent who obtains shared ownership of on after in is removed.
o1 → i1 → o2 → i2 → · · · → on → in → on+1
Second, when a cycle is cleared in some step, the remaining endowments of the agents
in the cycle are shared with the remaining owners of objects traded in the cycle. We
use these two designs to deal with co-ownership and redundant ownership. The following
examples illustrate the necessity of them.
Example 9 (First design). Consider four agents 1, 2, 3, 4 and three objects a, b, c.
2Although we adjust the order of agents in the algorithm, the order ⊲ is fixed.
14
a b c
ω: 1, 3 4 4
µ: 2 1 4
σ 3 1 4
≻1 ≻2 ≻3 ≻4
b a a c
a b
Suppose the order of agents is 4⊲2⊲1⊲3. In step one, 4 forms a cycle with his private
endowment c. In step two, 2 points to a, and a points to 1. In step three, 1 points to b.
Because 4 has left, b does not point to any agent. So 1 obtains b directly. In step four, 2
points to a and a points to 3. In step five, 3 forms a cycle with a. So YRMH-IGYT finds
the allocation σ.
However, suppose in step three we clear the whole chain 2 → a → 1 → b. Then we
will obtain the allocation µ, which is induction blocked by {1, 3, 4} via σ.
Example 10 (Second design). Consider four agents 1, 2, 3, 4 and four objects a, b, c, d.
a b c d
Co: 1, 2, 3 2 3 4
µ: 2 4 1 3
σ: 2 3 1 4
≻1 ≻2 ≻3 ≻4
a a b a
d c d b
b b c d
c d a c
Suppose the order of agents is 4 ⊲ 2 ⊲ 3 ⊲ 1. In step one, 4 points to a and a points
to 2. In step two, 2 forms a cycle with a. After they are removed, because 1 and 3 are
owners of a and b is 2’s remaining endowment, 1 and 3 obtain the shared ownership of b.
In step three, 4 points to b and b points to 3. In step four, 3 forms a cycle with b. In step
five, 4 forms a cycle with d. In step six, 1 obtains c. So we find the allocation σ.
However, suppose in step two 1 and 3 do not obtain the shared ownership of b. Then
in step three, 4 will directly obtain b, and the found allocation will be µ. But µ is induction
blocked by {1, 2, 3} via σ.
The main result of this section is the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Every outcome of YRMH-IGYT is a refinement core allocation.
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Example 11 shows that YRMH-IGYT cannot find all refinement core allocations.
Example 11 (YRMH-IGYT ( refinement core). Consider three agents 1, 2, 3 and three
objects a, b, c.
a b c
Co: 2, 3 1 1
µ1: 2 1 3
µ2: 3 1 2
σ: 1 2 3
≻1 ≻2 ≻3
a a a
b b c
c c b
Because all agents most prefer a, which is co-owned by 2 and 3, in every outcome of
YRMH-IGYT, one of 2 and 3 must obtain a. Given that, 1 must obtain b. So µ1 and µ2
are the allocations found by YRMH-IGYT. But σ belongs to the refinement core, because 2
and 3 have no way to make both of them strictly better off by excluding 1, and they neither
induction block σ because the coalition must include 1. σ also belongs to the strong core.
6 Special economies
We analyze special cases of our model in this section. They include well-studied object
allocation models in the literature. Some results in this section support our intuition that
the induction core is more aligned with the conventional core than the exclusion core. We
first analyze a type of economies in which agents may co-own objects but they do not
have redundant endowments. We prove that the strong core is nonempty. This proves
our statement in Introduction that the emptiness of the strong core is due to redundant
endowments, not due to co-owned endowments.
We say an economy is no-redundant-ownership if, for every coalition C, |ω(C)| ≤ |C|,
and every agent prefers every object to ∅. If some agents do not accept their endowments,
their endowments become redundant and the situation in Example 1 can appear.
Proposition 1. In a no-redundant-ownership economy, strong core=induction core.
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In words, without redundant endowments, the strong core coincides with the induction
core. So all outcomes of YRMH-IGYT belong to the strong core. The strong core and
the exclusion core still do not include each other. Example 12 below is a no-redundant-
ownership economy. All exclusion core allocations in the example are found by YRMH-
IGYT, but some strong core allocation is not found by YRMH-IGYT. In Example 2, the
allocation µ does not belong to the strong core but it belongs to the exclusion core.
A special case of no-redundant-ownership economies is that every agent owns at most
one object. That is, for every two distinct objects a and b, Ca ∩Cb = ∅. We call this type
of economies no-overlapping-ownership. For these economies, YRMH-IGYT is equivalent
to TTC by endowing every object to one of its owners, and it can find all strong core
allocations. The behind intuition is same as the unique strong core allocation result in
the housing market model. The housing market model belongs to this type of economies.
Example 2 also belongs to this type. So the strong core is a subset of the exclusion core.
Proposition 2. In a no-overlapping-ownership economy, YRMH-IGYT=strong core=
induction core⊂exclusion core.
Now we analyze another type of economies in which agents may have redundant private
endowments, but they do not co-own objects. We say an economy is private-ownership if
for every o, |Co| = 1. Example 1 belongs to this type, so the strong core may be empty.
The housing market model also belongs to this type. For this type, YRMH-IGYT is
much like the familiar definition because every object has a single owner and agents do
not share redundant endowments. We regard the following proposition as the extension
of the well-known result in the housing market model that TTC finds the unique strong
core allocation.
Proposition 3. In a private-ownership economy, YRMH-IGYT=induction core=exclusion
core.
We say an object o is publicly owned if Co = I, and call o a public endowment. An
economy is private-public-ownership if every object is either privately owned or publicly
owned. It turns out that how to interpret public endowments is tricky for our solution. In
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the house allocation model and the housing market model, degenerations of YRMH-IGYT
find all strong core allocations. However, Example 12 (taken from BK) presents a hybrid
of the two models, which is the so-called house allocation of with existing tenants model
(HET), and shows that YRMH-IGYT cannot find all strong core allocations.
Example 12 (YRMH-IGYT ( strong core in HET). Consider four agents 1, 2, 3, 4 and
four objects a, b, c, d. Object d is publicly owned, and the others are privately owned.
a b c d
Co: 1 2 3 1, 2, 3, 4
µ: 1 3 2 4
σ1 4 1 3 2
σ2 1 3 4 2
≻1 ≻2 ≻3 ≻4
b d b a
a c c d
b c
There are three strong core (and also induction core) allocations µ, σ1, σ2, but only σ1, σ2
are found by YRMH-IGYT and belong to the exclusion core. µ is exclusion blocked by
{1, 2, 4} via σ1. µ is not weakly blocked because any coalition has to involve d and thus all
agents.
Given that every object has to be endowed to some agents, it seems natural to regard
public endowments as owned by all agents. However, it is also natural to regard public
endowments as privately owned by the null agent ∅ who demands nothing. Actually, this
interpretation has implicitly appeared in the familiar house allocation model where we
often regard objects as controlled by a social planner who allocates the objects to agents.
By regarding ∅ as an agent, every private-public-ownership economy is translated into an
equivalent private-ownership economy. This translation does not change the procedure
of YRMH-IGYT because letting public endowments point to the ⊲-highest agent in any
step is equivalent to letting them not point to any agent. It neither changes the exclusion
core, because when an agent obtains a public endowment, he is impossible to be excluded
unless the new allocation is a Pareto improvement. However, this translation restores the
equivalence result in Proposition 3.
Formally, given an economy Γ = (I, O,≻I , {Co}o∈O), we define Γ
∗ = (I¯ , O,≻I¯ , {C
∗
o}o∈O)
in which I¯ = I ∪ {∅}, for all o ∈ O, C∗o = {∅} if Co = I and otherwise C
∗
o = Co, and the
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agent ∅ most prefers the null object. We call the induction core for Γ∗ the induction core*
for Γ. So the induction core* is a refinement of the induction core for Γ. Proposition 3
immediately implies the following result.
Proposition 4. In a private-public-ownership economy, YRMH-IGYT=induction core*=
exclusion core.
We can similarly refine the strong core for HET. In an HET economy, let Op denote
the set of public endowments. When a coalition weakly blocks an allocation µ, the objects
they can reallocate include their endowments, public endowments assigned to them in µ,
and unassigned public endowments.
Definition 5. An allocation µ is weakly blocked* by a coalition C via another σ if
1. ∀i ∈ C, σ(i) %i µ(i) and ∃j ∈ C, σ(j) ≻j µ(j);
2. σ(C) ⊂ ω¯(C) ∪ [µ(C¯) ∩ Op].
The strong core* consists of allocations that are not weakly blocked*.
In Example 12, {1, 2, 4} weakly block* µ via σ1. In HET, the strong core* coincides
with the induction core*.
For well-studied models in the literature, we obtain the following corollary of the
propositions in this section.
Corollary 1. 1. In housing market, TTC=strong core=induction core=exclusion core;
2. In house allocation, PE=strong core=induction core=exclusion core;
3. In HET, YRMH-IGYT=strong core*=induction core*=exclusion core.
7 Discussion
House allocation, housing market, and their hybrid HET have been well studied since
they were presented decades ago (Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979; Shapley and Scarf, 1974;
Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1999). Because the strong core is nonempty in these special
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cases, some reader may believe that the strong core is the desirable solution whenever
it is nonempty in our model. In our opinion, since the strong core rules out desirable
allocations in economies like Example 1, it may also rule out desirable allocations even
when it is nonempty (see Example 7). So it is necessary to supersede the strong core with
new solutions even when the strong core is nonempty.
The two new solutions, the induction core and the exclusion core, are based on different
interpretations of property rights. They do not include each other, and in some sense
the induction core is more aligned with the conventional core. BK have shown that
in private-ownership economies the exclusion core is a superset of the strong core, and
they coincide in housing market and house allocation. Our results in Section 6 are more
general observations. To fix the inadequacy of the exclusion core shown in Example
2, we propose the refinement core. BK introduce relational economies and refine the
exclusion core in a different way. The strong exclusion core they define may be empty,
while the weak exclusion core is always nonempty. The weak exclusion core may include
allocations ruled out by the induction core. BK generalize TTC to find weak exclusion
core allocations. YRMH-IGYT is a special case of their mechanism. The allocations µ in
Example 9 and Example 10 can be found by BK’s mechanism, but they cannot be found
by YRMH-IGYT and are induction blocked. Balbuzanov and Kotowski (2019b) build the
right to exclude into a production network in which agents and firms interact through
input-output relations. It seems that the conventional interpretation of property rights
we follow cannot be similarly extended.
Sun et al. (2020) propose another new solution in the conventional flavor called the
effective core. The associated blocking notion, called effective block, can be obtained by
replacing the condition (3) of Definition 3 with condition (⋆):
(⋆) for every self-feasible C ′ ⊂ C, if a ∈ ω(C ′)\σ(C ′), then a /∈ σ(C) unless C = I.
In words, if a blocking coalition C does not include all agents, then any coalition member
cannot obtain redundant endowments of any self-feasible sub-coalition of C. It is clear
that if (⋆) is satisfied, our condition (3) is also satisfied. So effective block implies induc-
tion block, and the effective core is a superset of the induction core. Sun et al. define an
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extension of TTC. Like YRMH-IGYT, their mechanism has the design of sharing owner-
ship. However, their mechanism lets an object point to any remaining agent when all of
its owners and those who obtain shared ownership have been removed. This makes some
outcomes of their mechanism induction blocked. For example, in Example 9, if letting b
point to 2 after 4 is removed, there will be a cycle 2 → a → 1 → b → 2. Clearing the
cycle, we will obtain the allocation µ, which is induction blocked.
In Section 6, we define the strong core* and prove that it characterizes YRMH-IGYT
in HET. Ekici (2013) provides a similar characterization. But in his result the objects
that a blocking coalition can reallocate include their (ex-ante) endowments and (ex-post)
assignments. So a coalition may reallocate the others’ private endowments. This is
not allowed by weak block*. So¨nmez and U¨nver (2010) characterize YRMH-IGYT in an
axiomatic approach, which is different than ours.
In a general model, So¨nmez (1999) proves that there exists an individually rational,
Pareto efficient and strategy-proof mechanism only if the strong core is single-valued
whenever it is nonempty. Though an agent may own more than one objects in his model,
those objects are not redundant endowments. So his result does not apply to our model.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. (Only if) If µ is blocked by some C ∈ C1 via σ, then µ is also
induction blocked by C via σ. Suppose that for all ℓ < k and i ∈ I(Cℓ), σ(i) = µ(i), and
that µ is blocked by some C ∈ Ck via σ. Then µ is induction blocked by C ∪ I(∪k−1ℓ=1C
ℓ)
via σ.
(If) Suppose µ is induction blocked by some C via σ. If µ is C1-blocked via σ, we
are done. Otherwise, for all i ∈ I(C1), µ(i) = σ(i). So C /∈ C1, and C must contain a
self-enforcing coalition because C is self-feasible. Let C1 = C\I(C1), which is nonempty.
We prove that C1 is self-feasible with respect to ω1.
For every i ∈ C1, if σ(i) /∈ ω¯(C1), because σ(i) ∈ ω¯(C), it must be that Cσ(i) ∩
(C\C1) 6= ∅. If σ(i) ∈ ω(C\C1), by the third condition in Definition 3, σ(i) ∈ µ(C¯). If
σ(i) ∈ µ(∅), then σ(i) ∈ ω1(∅). If σ(i) ∈ µ(C), because µ(C\C1) = σ(C\C1) and i ∈ C1,
it must be that σ(i) ∈ µ(C1). So σ(i) ∈ ω1(C1). If σ(i) /∈ ω(C\C1), then the owners
of σ(i) within C1 have full control over σ(i) under ω1. So it is still that σ(i) ∈ ω1(C1).
Hence C1 is self-feasible with respect to ω1.
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If µ is C2-blocked via σ, we are done. Otherwise, C1 /∈ C2, and C1 must contain a
self-enforcing coalition in C2. Let C2 = C1\I(C2), which is nonempty. Because C contains
at least one strictly better off agent, continuing by induction, we must find some C ′ ⊂ C
such that C ′ ∈ Ck for some k, and µ is blocked by C ′ via σ.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let µ be an allocation by YRMH-IGYT with some order ⊲. Be-
cause YRMH-IGYT is a special case of BK’s GTTC, µ is not exclusion blocked and it is
Pareto efficient.
• To prove that that µ is not refinement blocked, we first prove that µ is not induction
blocked via any σ. We prove this result by induction.
Base case: Suppose µ is blocked by some C ∈ C1(µ, σ). Among coalition members
who become strictly better off in σ, let i0 be one member removed earliest in YRMH-
IGYT. So the object o1 = σ(i0)must be removed before i0. Let i
′ be the agent who obtains
o1 in µ, that is, µ(i
′) = o1. i
′ cannot belong to C because otherwise i′ is strictly better off
and this contradicts the definition of i0. Suppose i
′ obtains o1 in step t of YRMH-IGYT.
There are two cases.
Case 1: o1 does not point to any agent in step t. So Co1(t− 1) = ∅ and So1(t− 1) = ∅.
Because i0 obtains o1 in σ, all of its owners Co1 must belong to C, all owners of σ(Co1)
must belong to C, and so on. Continuing by induction, we will obtain a set of agents,
denoted by C ′, all of whom belong to C, and σ(C ′) ⊂ ω¯(C ′). If any of them is not
removed before step t, the agent must be the owner of o1 or obtain the shared ownership
of o1, which means that o1 should point to some agent in step t. So all agents in C
′
must be removed before step t. Thus for all i ∈ C ′, µ(i) = σ(i) and i0 /∈ C
′. It means
that σ(C ′) ⊂ ω¯(C ′) and C ′ ( C. But it contradicts the assumption that C is minimal
self-feasible.
Case 2: o1 is involved in a cycle in step t. Without loss of generality, denote the cycle
by
i′ → o1 → i1 → o2 → i2 → · · · → oℓ → i
′.
Then i1, the agent pointed by o1, must be an owner of o1, or obtain the shared
ownership of o1 in previous steps. In the former case, it is obvious that i1 ∈ C. In the
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latter case, all agents in Co1 must be removed before step t. Then we can derive C
′ as
in Case 1 so that i1 ∈ C
′. So we have i1 ∈ C. This means that σ(i1) = µ(i1) = o2. So
o2 ∈ ω(C). By inductively applying the above argument to the remaining agents in the
cycle, we conclude that all agents in the cycle must belong to C. But it contradicts the
earlier conclusion that i′ /∈ C.
Induction step: Assume for all 1 ≤ k′ < k and all i ∈ I(Ck
′
), µ(i) = σ(i). Suppose µ
is blocked by some C ∈ Ck via σ. Among coalition members who become strictly better off
in σ, let i0 be one member removed earliest in YRMH-IGYT. Then the object o1 = σ(i0)
must be removed before i0, and the agent i
′ such that µ(i′) = o1 cannot belong to C. It
is clear that o1 /∈ σ(C
k′) for all k′ < k. Suppose i′ obtains o1 in step t of YRMH-IGYT.
Because C is self-enforcing with respect to ωk−1 and i′ /∈ C, Ck−1o1 must belong to C and
Ck−1o1 ⊂ Co1. There are two cases.
Case 1: o1 does not point to any agent in step t. Let C
′ be the set constructed as in
the base case that contains all owners of o1, all owners of σ(Co1), and so on. As in the
base case i0 /∈ C
′. Here we similarly construct a set C∗ that contains Ck−1o1 , the owners
of σ(Ck−1o1 ) with respect to ω
k−1, and so on. Then C∗ ⊂ C and σ(C∗) ⊂ ω¯k−1(C∗). C∗ is
also a subset of C ′. So i0 /∈ C
∗. But this means that C is not minimal self-feasible with
respect to ωk−1, which is a contradiction.
Case 2: o1 is involved in a cycle in step t. Without loss of generality, denote the cycle
by
i′ → o1 → i1 → o2 → i2 → · · · → oℓ → i
′.
Then, i1 must be an owner of o1, or obtain the shared ownership of o1 in previous
steps. We prove that if i1 ∈ I(∪
k−1
ℓ=1C
ℓ), then all agents in the cycle belong to I(∪k−1ℓ=1C
ℓ),
which is a contradiction.
If i1 ∈ I(C
1), then σ(i1) = µ(i1) = o2 ∈ σ(C
1). Then no matter i2 is an owner of o2 or
i2 obtains the shared ownership of o2, i2 must belong to I(C
1). By induction, all agents
in the cycle belong to I(C1), which is a contradiction. So no agent in the cycle belongs
to I(C1). If i1 ∈ I(C
2), then o2 ∈ σ(C
2). Then similarly, no matter i2 is an owner of o2 or
i2 obtains the shared ownership of o2, i2 must belong to I(C
2). Continuing by induction,
24
we can prove that if i1 ∈ I(∪
k−1
ℓ=1C
ℓ), then all agents in the cycle belong to I(∪k−1ℓ=1C
ℓ).
So i1 /∈ I(∪
k−1
ℓ=1C
ℓ). By constructing C∗ as in Case 1, we must have i1 ∈ C
∗ ⊂ C. By
the definition of i0, σ(i1) = µ(i1) = o2. So o2 ∈ ω(C). By inductively applying the above
arguments for o1 and i1 to the remaining agents and objects in the cycle, we conclude
that i′ belongs to C, which is a contradiction.
•We then prove that, assuming for all 1 ≤ k′ ≤ k and all i ∈ I(Ck
′
), µ(i) = σ(i), there
does not exist any C ⊂ I\I(∪kℓ=1C
ℓ) such that, for every i ∈ C, σ(i) ≻i µ(i), and
µ(j) ≻j σ(j) =⇒ µ(j) ∈ Ω
(
C|ωk, µ
)
.
Suppose such C exists. Then σ(C) ∩ µ(Ck
′
) = ∅ for every k′ ≤ k because µ(Ck
′
) =
σ(Ck
′
). Without loss of generality, let C include all strictly better off agents in σ. Among
agents who are strictly worse off in σ, let j0 be one of those removed earliest in YRMH-
IGYT. Suppose j0 is removed in step t0. Let i1 be one of the agents in C who are removed
earliest in YRMH-IGYT. Suppose i1 is removed in step t1. Because σ(i1) is better than
µ(i1), σ(i1)must be removed before t1. Let j1 be the agent who obtains σ(i1) in µ. Then j1
cannot belong to C because otherwise it contradicts the definition of i1. Since C includes
all strictly better off agents, j1 must be strictly worse off in σ. So j1 cannot be removed
earlier than j0. It means t1 > t0.
Now we prove that µ(j0) /∈ Ω
(
C|ωk, µ
)
. Recall that Ω
(
C|ωk, µ
)
= ωk(∪∞ℓ=0C
ℓ), where
C0 = C and Cℓ = Cℓ−1 ∪ (µ−1 ◦ ωk)(Cℓ−1) for every ℓ ≥ 1. Also note that Ω
(
C|ωk, µ
)
∩
µ(Ck
′
) = ∅ for every k′ ≤ k, because µ(Ck
′
) ⊂ ω¯(Ck
′
).
Suppose µ(j0) ∈ ω
k(C). It means that Ckµ(j0) ⊂ C. Given j0 /∈ C
k
µ(j0)
, it must be
that Ckµ(j0) ⊂ Cµ(j0). Because we have proved that all agents in C must be removed after
step t0, µ(j0) must point to an owner in step t0. The pointed owner does not belong to
I(∪kℓ=1C
ℓ), because otherwise, as we have proved before, all agents in the cycle involving
µ(j0) must belong to I(∪
k
ℓ=1C
ℓ), which contradicts the definition of j0. So the pointed
owner must belong to Ckµ(j0). But it means that the pointed owner is removed in step t0,
which contradicts t1 > t0.
Now suppose µ(j0) /∈ ω
k(Cℓ
′
) for all ℓ′ < ℓ, and µ(j0) ∈ ω
k(Cℓ). It means that
Ckµ(j0) ⊂ C
ℓ. Similarly as above, if all agents in Ckµ(j0) are removed after step t0, then µ(j0)
25
must point to some owner in Ckµ(j0) in step t0, which means that the owner is removed
in step t0. So at least one agent in C
k
µ(j0)
is removed no later than step t0. Recall that
Cℓ = Cℓ−1 ∪ (µ−1 ◦ ωk)(Cℓ−1). We prove that at least one agent in Cℓ−1 is removed no
later than every agent in (µ−1 ◦ ωk)(Cℓ−1).
Let j1 be one agent in (µ
−1◦ωk)(Cℓ−1) who is removed earliest in YRMH-IGYT. Then
Ckµ(j1) ⊂ C
ℓ−1. Suppose j1 is removed in step t2. If µ(j1) does not point to any agent in
step t2, all agents in C
k
µ(j1)
must be removed before step t2. Otherwise, µ(j1) must point
to some owner in Ckµ(j1) in step t2. Then the pointed owner is removed in step t2. So at
least one agent in Ckµ(j1) is removed no later than t2, and this agent belongs to C
ℓ−1.
By inductively applying the above argument to every ℓ′ < ℓ, we conclude that there
must exist some agent in C0 = C who is removed no later than every agent in Cℓ. So the
agent is removed no later than step t0, which contradicts t1 > t0.
So by induction, µ(j0) /∈ ω
k(Cℓ) for every ℓ ≥ 0. It means that µ(j0) /∈ Ω
(
C|ωk, µ
)
.
Proof of Proposition 1. We prove that every induction core allocation belongs to the
strong core. Suppose µ is an induction core allocation, and it is weakly blocked via
another allocation σ. Let C be a minimal coalition that weakly blocks µ via σ. That
is, if C ′ is a sub-coalition of C that is self-feasible in σ, then for all i ∈ C ′, µ(i) = σ(i).
It means that µ(C ′) ⊂ ω¯(C ′). Because |ω(C ′)| ≤ |C ′|, if there exists j ∈ C\C ′ with
µ(j) ∈ ω(C ′)\µ(C ′), then some agent in C ′ must obtain nothing in µ. But then C ′
weakly blocks µ by allocating ω(C ′) to themselves and making at least the agent without
an object strictly better off. It contradicts the definition of C. So there does not exist
j ∈ C\C ′ such that µ(j) ∈ ω(C ′)\µ(C ′). But this means that C induction blocks µ via
σ, because the third condition in Definition 3 is satisfied. This is still a contradiction. So
µ is a strong core allocation.
Proof of Proposition 2. It suffices to prove that all strong core allocations can be found
by YRMH-IGYT. In a strong core allocation µ, it must be that, for every o ∈ O, only one
agent in Co obtains an object. Denote the agent by io. Then µ must be found by TTC by
endowing every o to io, which is equivalent to YRMH-IGYT with some order. Given that
26
the strong core is equivalent to the induction core and all outcomes of YRMH-IGYT belong
to the induction core and the exclusion core, the other results follow immediately.
Proof of Proposition 3. We prove that if an allocation µ belongs either to the induction
core or to the exclusion core, it must be found by YRMH-IGYT with some order ⊲. We
will repeat two operations to find the order ⊲. Because the proofs for the two core notions
share similar steps, we prove them simultaneously.
Operation A: Let all agents point to their favorite objects and all objects point to
their owners. There must exist cycles, and cycles are disjoint. These cycles also appear
in YRMH-IGYT with any order. Suppose in some cycle not all agents C obtain the
objects pointed by them in µ. Let C1 be the subset of C who obtain objects pointed by
them, and C2 the set of the remaining agents in C. It must be that ω(C) ⊂ Ω(C2|ω, µ).
Then C2 exclusion blocks µ via another allocation σ in which, for all i ∈ C, σ(i) is the
object pointed by i, for all j ∈ I\C with µ(j) ∈ σ(C), σ(j) = ∅, and for every other i′,
σ(i′) = µ(i′). Every agent in C2 is strictly better off in σ. Similarly, C can induction
block µ via σ because they are self-enforcing and at least one agent is strictly better off.
This means that every agent in every cycle must obtain the object pointed by him in µ.
Remove all cycles. Let remaining agents point to favorite remaining objects. If there
exist cycles, these cycles must be disjoint and also appear in YRMH-IGYT with any
order. Remove these cycles. Repeat this operation until no cycles appear. By inductively
applying the above arguments, all these cycles must appear in YRMH-IGYT with any
order, and the agents in every cycle must obtain the objects pointed by them in µ. Denote
the set of all these agents by D1. Place D1 at the bottom of the order ⊲ and rank them
arbitrarily.
Operation B: After Operation A, all remaining agents point to favorite remaining objects
but they do not form cycles. So they must form disjoint trees. The root of each tree is
an object that does not point to any agent, because its single owner has been removed in
Operation A. Denote these roots by o1, o2, . . . , om. Every remaining agent must be linked
to one root through a directed path. For every ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , m}, let Iℓ denote the set of the
remaining agents who directly point to oℓ.
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Claim. There exist oℓ and i ∈ Iℓ such that µ(i) = oℓ.
Proof of Claim. Suppose the claim is not true. Then we prove that µ is induction blocked
and also exclusion blocked. Because µ is Pareto efficient, every oℓ must be assigned to
some agent in µ. Let iℓ /∈ Iℓ be the agent who obtains oℓ. If there exists some iℓ who
is linked to oℓ through a directed path, then let C be the set of the agents in the path.
Among them let C1 be the set of agents who obtain the objects pointed by them, and
C2 the set of remaining agents. So ω(C) ⊂ Ω(C2|ω, µ). Then C2 exclusion blocks µ via
another allocation σ in which, for all i ∈ C, σ(i) is the object pointed by i, for all j
not in C with µ(j) ∈ σ(C), σ(j) = ∅, and for all other i′, σ(i′) = µ(i′). All agents in
C2 are strictly better off in σ. Similarly, C induction blocks µ via σ because oℓ must
be the forgone endowment of the agents who have been removed, and given that, C is
self-enforcing.
If there does not exist iℓ who is linked to oℓ, then let {ℓ1, ℓ2, . . . , ℓx} be a smallest
subset (in set inclusion sense) of {1, 2, . . . , m} such that, for every y ∈ {1, . . . , x}, iℓy is
linked to some oℓz with z ∈ {1, . . . , x}. Such a subset must exist, because in the worst
case {1, 2, . . . , m} is such a set. Let C consist of the agents in the directed paths that
link every iℓy to oℓz . Let C1 be the set of those in C who obtain the objects pointed by
them, and C2 the set of remaining agents. So ω(C) ⊂ Ω(C2|ω, µ). Then C2 exclusion
blocks µ via another allocation σ in which, for every i ∈ C, σ(i) is the object pointed by
i, for every j not in C with µ(j) ∈ σ(C), σ(j) = ∅, and for every other i′, σ(i′) = µ(i′).
Similarly, C induction blocks µ via σ because all oℓy must be the forgone endowment of
the agents who have been removed, and given that, C is self-enforcing. ¶
Denote the set of the agents satisfying the above claim by U1. Place U1 at the top of
the order ⊲ and rank them arbitrarily. Remove U1 with their assignments.
For the remaining agents, repeat Operation A and Operation B. After we obtain the
set of agents Dk in Operation A, place them right above Dk−1 in the order ⊲, and rank
them arbitrarily. After we obtain the set of agents Uk in Operation B, place them right
below Uk−1 in the order ⊲, and rank them arbitrarily. It is easy to verify that µ is found
by YRMH-IGYT with ⊲.
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